U.S. Assistance for Democratic Reform in Russia: an Assessment by Kupchan, Clifford
U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR DEMOCRATIC 
REFORM IN RUSSIA: AN ASSESSMENT 
Clifford Kupchan
U
.S. assistance programs to promote democracy 
and civil society in Russia have been 
successful in helping Russia embark on the 
long, difficult road of building democracy. Only eight 
years ago, Russia was part of the Soviet Union; 
democracy was proscribed by the regime. Since then, 
Russia has taken important steps forward-mostly on its 
own, but with U.S. help.
Russia is today an electoral, though not a liberal, 
democracy. Elections have been accepted, by all major 
political actors, as the only game in town for assuming 
political power. The December 1999 Duma election is 
the latest in a series of national and regional elections. 
Turnout rates have been high (61 percent voted in the 
Duma election), the elections have generally met a 
“free and fair” standard, and a significant number of 
incumbents have lost. Given Russia’s thousand-year 
authoritarian history, progress made during the last 
decade is remarkable.
Yet Russia’s democracy is young and flawed. A 
liberal democracy features an independent judiciary, a 
respected constitution, an independent media, the rule 
of law, a robust civil society, strong political parties, 
and a strong and democratically-elected parliament. 
Many of these attributes are weak in today’s Russia; 
corruption is endemic, and political parties are weak. 
But Russia has taken steps forward, with U.S. 
assistance, on many elements of liberal democracy. 
Regarding civil society, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) are growing across Russia. 
Russians, perhaps for the first time, now enjoy 
“political space.” Access to the internet and 
independent media, freedom of assembly and 
expression, vastly increased (if incomplete) freedom of 
religion—these aspects of Russian life are now almost 
taken for granted. An independent judiciary and media 
are fledgling, but growing. Again, these are Russian 
achievements-but U.S. assistance helped in each area.
In this essay, I will discuss the most successful 
democracy programs of the United States, our less 
productive ones, and where U.S. efforts will be focused
in the future. My central point is that our most 
successful programs have proven to be grassroots 
programs such as exchanges, support for NGOs, and 
internet access. These programs have yielded higher 
dividends than those that work with the Russian central 
government or with existing, “top-down” institutions. 
One of the main lessons learned over the past decade is 
that building the range of liberal democratic institutions 
in Russia will be a long-term, generational, even 
multigenerational process. The best way for America 
to help is by persistently engaging Russians at the 
grassroots.
America’s Most Successful Efforts 
to Promote Democratic Reform in 
Russia
U.S. exchange programs have proven to be among 
our best vehicles to promote democracy in Russia. The 
United States has concentrated resources on exchanges, 
and through them has promoted more democratic, pro-
market mindsets among the next generation of Russian 
leaders. Over 40,000 Russians have visited the U.S. on 
exchanges since 1993, exposing them to the American 
system and providing training in practical democratic 
and market-related skills. Participants have included 
students, entrepreneurs, regional government officials, 
and many others.
Exchanges work at the grassroots by changing 
mindsets. And there is increasing evidence in the 
development literature that promoting ownership of 
ideas (in this case, ideas about democracy) is more 
effective in promoting reform than standard IMF or 
World Bank conditionality.1 The studies show that 
domestic support for reform is the most important
See The World Bank, Assessing AID: What Works, What 
Doesn’t and Why (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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variable affecting the success of aid. 
Exchanges-exposure to the U.S. and alternative ideas 
about organizing society-are among our best ways of 
promoting support for the idea of democracy among 
Russians. Exchanges, therefore, both directly promote 
democratic reform and create an environment in which 
other democracy programs can be effective.
There is also empirical evidence that exchanges 
work. Surveys show that returned high school exchange 
participants are more supportive of democracy and 
market ideas than their counterparts.2 They also show 
that participants in business-oriented exchanges are 
more supportive of rapid economic reform and foreign 
investment, and are more optimistic than their peers 
about Russia’s future.3
The U.S. Regional Initiative (RI) focuses a wide 
range of assistance programs on progressive Russian 
regions. The goal is to create successful models of 
regional development which can be replicated in other 
regions and serve as models for reform of the central 
government. Democracy building is one key 
component of the Regional Initiatives, which also 
include programs that focus on small business 
development and investment promotion. The U.S. is 
currently targeting Novgorod, Samara, and Sakhalin; a 
fourth site will begin this year in Tomsk. RI has helped 
increase citizen participation in regional government, 
bring more transparency to budget processes, and 
strengthen regional NGOs.
U.S. assistance to NGOs has strengthened Russia’s 
rudimentary civil society; NGOs actively involve 
citizens in Russian political life. There are now over 
65,000 active, registered NGOs in Russia. At least 15 
percent have received U.S. support. Fifty-four U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) NGO 
Resource Centers have provided small grants and 
training to NGOs across Russia. The Siberian Resource 
Center in Novosibirsk has been particularly successful 
in reaching more than 1,000 grassroots organizations 
across an area the size of the continental U.S.
Though the majority of Russian NGOs are small, 
some have influenced legislation at the national and 
regional level. NGOs that help regional and local
U.S. Information Agency, “FLEX Alumni: A Breed Apart From 
Other Russian Youth,” Opinion Analysis, September 1, 1998.
3 Susan Lehman, “BFR Program Evaluation,” March 22, 1999 
(unpublished manuscript).
governments deliver social services play an especially 
important role in Russia. In Novgorod, for example, 
the U.S. helped the regional government set up a 
competitive bidding process that resulted in NGOs 
providing a number of local services. The newly 
formed Russian Association of Crisis Centers has 
brought together over 40 local centers that assist 
victims of domestic violence.
The U.S. has effectively supported the growth of 
independent media, especially in Russia’s regions. 
Most Russian media are heavily controlled by oligarchs 
and regional administrations, but some outlets have 
increased their advertising revenue and independence. 
AID, through the NGO Internews, has assisted over 
300 regional non-state TV stations throughout Russia. 
Some of these stations offer very open, critical views of 
local and national events. Independent stations have 
raised their audience share to over 30 percent in many 
local markets. In the print sector, the National Press 
Institute (which has received U.S. support through New 
York University) has provided professional and other 
support to 110 non-state papers, increasing the papers’ 
self-sustainability in the vast majority of cases.
Together with the Open Society Institute, the U.S. 
Information Agency (now part of the State Department) 
has increased Russians’ access to the internet. 
Bringing the free flow of ideas to Russia promotes 
democracy and civil society. Also, the restoration of 
authoritarianism is much harder once citizens are 
accustomed to intellectual freedom. Since 1996, USIA 
has established over 50 public access internet sites 
across Russia and the New Independent States 
(NlS)-reaching over 10,000 users. Thirty-three of 
these sites are in Russia.
Russia hjts established a culture of relatively free 
and fair elections. Though many aspects of this culture 
remain problematic, including campaign finance and 
equal access for candidates to the media, Russia’s 
adoption of elections is a seminal advance. At least in 
a small way, U.S. assistance helped promote Russia’s 
electoral culture. The AID-funded International 
Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) has helped 
develop more professional election procedures 
throughout Russia by working with the Central 
Election Commission. It has also helped increase the 
capacity of regional authorities to hold elections, and 
has conducted a range of voter education programs.
Finally, the U.S. has worked to promote judicial 
reform in Russia-these programs have met with more 
success than is commonly recognized. After
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considerable exposure through exchanges to the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Russian 
experts established the Judicial Department in 1997 
outside the Ministry of Justice. The Department 
administers the Courts of General Jurisdiction. Control 
of the courts by an apolitical organ of the judiciary 
significantly increases judicial independence. In 1998, 
the Department received its first separate appropriation, 
though it is seriously underfunded. U.S. programs are 
working with the Judicial Department to increase its 
independence.
USAID has for several years worked with the 
Commercial (Arbitrazh) Courts - because they have 
always been independent of the Ministry of Justice and 
more open to reform. We have worked with the 
Commercial Courts to train hundreds of judges in 
fundamental concepts of market-oriented commercial 
law. Also, we are working with the Russian council 
that sits in judgment of judges accused of ethics lapses, 
helping it improve work on legal ethics.
The U.S. has also emphasized grassroots legal 
reform. AID-funded American Bar Association 
programs work with lawyers and legal professional 
groups to develop advocacy skills and responsiveness 
to public needs. We have supported law school 
curriculum reform, and the expansion of clinical legal 
education and legal clinics. These clinics - examples 
include clinics on environmental, labor, and women’s 
issues-help channel citizens’ real grievances into the 
courts. They are in effect helping create a “demand” 
side to legal reform by promoting use of and trust in the 
courts.
However, building respect for the rule of law and 
stemming corruption will be a long-term process. 
Respect for civil and commercial law remains at a low 
level. Corruption is pervasive in Russia. While U.S. 
assistance has promoted reform on rule of law issues, 
foreign aid cannot induce major changes in this most 
basic element of Russian society. Only the political 
will of the Russian people, acting through a democratic 
political system, can eradicate corruption, build a 
strong and independent judiciary, and install the rule of 
law.
The Problem of
Interest Articulation in Russia
I will now turn to a key area where U.S. assistance 
has worked with lower rates of success. In Russia, 
interest aggregation and articulation into the political 
system have not developed to a significant extent. 
There is very little “bottom up” communication of 
interests from Russian citizens to their politicians. 
Political parties serve this function in Western 
democracies, but political parties have not matured as 
many expected in Russia, despite well-designed efforts 
to nurture them in our assistance program. Nor have 
NGOs stepped in to fill much of this void. It is a 
central problem in the development of Russian 
democracy.
Many reasons for the lack of interest articulation 
are plausible. First, Russians do not have an answer to 
the question: “How can democracy improve my life?” 
Most Russians are fundamentally not convinced that it 
can. They see no evidence that democracy can or will 
improve the quality of their lives.4 Many Russians do 
not think that elected officials effectively represent 
their interests. Russian history has left post-Soviet 
Russia with no organic link between the people and the 
government, and the Yeltsin regime did not try to build 
this link.
Second, Russian political culture remains 
predominantly “top-down” in structure. Elite politics 
and interests count more than public opinion. Almost 
all political parties are elite structures-either Kremlin 
dominated (Unity), personality-driven (Otechestvo, 
LDPR), or hierarchical (KPRF). Only Yabloko and the 
Union of Right-Wing Forces (SPS) have some 
grassroots character; but Yabloko lost standing in last 
year’s Duma election, and SPS’ success was related to 
its endorsement of the war in Chechnya. Regarding 
regional politics, most governors have immense 
power-in the worst cases, they preside in a feudal-like 
manner.
The third and perhaps central reason for the lack of 
interest articulation is the stunted growth of the middle 
class in Russia-an incipient middle class was hit hard 
by the August 1998 financial crisis. The middle class 
is the bulwark of democracy for several reasons. They
4
The author has visited over a dozen Russian regions during the 
past 18 months; these observations are based on discussions with 
Russians across the country.
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have a vested interest in the system-the middle class 
benefit from property rights and actively support the 
rule of law to protect these rights. The middle class 
have the “leisure time” to engage in interest articulation 
and political activity. And members of this class 
typically feel empowered to affect their political 
environment; Americans, for example, tend to form 
groups to advance causes.
Probably for a combination of these reasons, 
interest articulation is a key missing element of Russian 
democracy. The Russian political landscape is not 
ready for political parties as we know them in the West. 
U.S. assistance, with noble goals, has promoted 
political party building, but with quite limited success.
Looking Ahead
Our most successful programs, not surprisingly, 
represent the future of U.S. assistance for democratic 
reform in Russia. The United States will emphasize 
grassroots programs, recognizing that the transition will 
be a long one. Exchanges, internet, and support for 
NGOs and independent media will be priorities. We 
will continue the Regional Initiative, which has proven 
to be a dynamic program that targets reformist 
interlocutors in the regions. The U.S. will also 
promote, to the extent resources allow, the growth of 
the middle class in Russia-through programs such as 
support for small business. We will attempt to help this 
key constituency for democracy grow. Finally, we will 
implement a new initiative to strengthen a Russian 
school of public policy at Moscow State University. 
An American university will work in partnership with 
Moscow State to improve training for aspiring and 
current officials in budgeting, management, ethics, and 
a range of other governance-related issues.
Americans should have no illusions that we can 
create democracy in Russia. Russian democracy is for 
Russians to create, if they so choose. But we do have 
strong programs in place, programs that are making a 
contribution to the long-term process of democratic 
reform.
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